Agenda Item No.

HUMBERSIDE
POLICE & CRIME
COMMISSIONER

TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT

2022/23

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the PCC's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the PCC's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the PCC, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the PCC can meet his capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet a risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

> *"The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

PCC's are subject to the same requirements as Local Authority's in respect of treasury management.

Reporting requirements

The PCC is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals, additionally the PCC will receive quarterly update reports.

Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy (this report) - The first and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

A mid-year treasury management report – This will update the PCC with the progress of the capital position.

An annual treasury report – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

Quarterly update reports – This will provide the PCC with a quarterly update of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.

Scrutiny
The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the PCC. This role is undertaken by the Joint Independent Audit Committee (JIAC).

Capital Strategy
In December 2017, CIPFA issued revised Prudential and Treasury Management Codes. As from 2019-20, all local authorities and PCCs are required to prepare an additional report, a Capital Strategy report, which is intended to provide the following:-

- a high-level overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services;
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed;
- the implications for future financial sustainability.

The aim of this report is to ensure that the PCC fully understands the overall strategy, governance procedures and risk appetite. The Capital Strategy is set out at Appendix 8 of this report.

Treasury Management Strategy for 2022/23

The strategy for 2022/23 covers two main areas:

Capital issues
- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

Treasury management issues
- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the PCC;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that the PCC with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Members of Joint Independent Audit Committee (JIAC) who are responsible for scrutiny. Training will be arranged as required.

Treasury management consultants
The PCC uses Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The PCC recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The PCC will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2022/23 – 2025/26

The PCC's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist the PCC's overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

Capital expenditure – Indicator 1

This prudential indicator is a summary of the PCC's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle.

Capital expenditure £m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Total	**28.573**	**16.236**	**11.198**	**10.822**	**5.221**

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Financing of capital expenditure £m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Net financing need for the year	**28.573**	**16.236**	**11.198**	**10.822**	**5.221**

The PCC's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement) – Indicator 2

The second prudential indicator is the PCC's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the PCC's indebtedness and indicates underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each assets life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

The PCC is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

£m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Capital Financing Requirement					
Total CFR	**126.933**	**137.882**	**141.842**	**144.282**	**140.640**
CFR as a % of Budget Requirement	**60.27%**	**62.67%**	**62.24%**	**61.75%**	**58.86%**
Movement in CFR	**24.871**	**10.949**	**3.960**	**2.440**	**(3.642)**
Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)	28.573	16.236	11.198	10.822	5.221
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	(3.702)	(5.287)	(7.238)	(8.382)	(8.863)
Movement in CFR	**24.871**	**10.949**	**3.960**	**2.440**	**(3.642)**

This table shows CFR increasing to circa 60% of our Budget Requirement (BR) over the period 2022/23 to 2025/26, before beginning to fall.

*IFRS16 Leases comes into effect from 2021/22 (delayed for one year). The impact of this is yet to be established and will be reviewed throughout the year.

Core funds and expected investment balances – Indicator 3

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources £m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Fund balances / reserves	21.600	22.100	20.300	18.700	16.200
Total core funds	**21.600**	**22.100**	**20.300**	**18.700**	**16.200**
Working capital*	**(10.000)**	**(10.000)**	**(10.000)**	**(10.000)**	**(10.000)**
(Under)/over borrowing	(21.670)	(19.860)	(16.333)	(11.663)	(4.349)
Expected investments	**(10.070)**	**(7.760)**	**(6.033)**	**(2.963)**	**1.851**

*Working capital balances shown are estimated year-end; these may be higher mid-year

TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2022/23 – 2025/26

The capital expenditure plans set out in this section provide details of the service activity of the PCC. The treasury management function ensures that the PCC's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the PCC's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

Current portfolio position

The PCC's estimated treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2022, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
External Debt					
Debt at 1 April	88.588	105.263	118.022	125.509	132.619
Expected change in Debt	16.675	12.759	7.487	7.110	3.672
Actual gross debt at 31 March	**105.263**	**118.022**	**125.509**	**132.619**	**136.291**
The Capital Financing Requirement	**126.933**	**137.882**	**141.842**	**144.282**	**140.640**
Under / (over) borrowing	**21.670**	**19.860**	**16.333**	**11.663**	**4.349**

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the PCC operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the PCC needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2022/23 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Chief Finance Officer & S.151 Officer reports that the PCC complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

The operational boundary – Indicator 4

This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Operational boundary £m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate
Debt	150.000	150.000	150.000	150.000	150.000
Total	**150.000**	**150.000**	**150.000**	**150.000**	**150.000**

The authorised limit for external debt – Indicator 5

A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the PCC. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all PCCs' plans, or those of a specific PCC, although this power has not yet been exercised.

2. The PCC is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Authorised limit £m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Debt	180.000	180.000	180.000	180.000	180.000
Total	**180.000**	**180.000**	**180.000**	**180.000**	**180.000**

Prospects for interest rates

The PCC has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the PCC to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 7 February 2022. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80bps:

Link Group Interest Rate View 7.2.22	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
3 month av. earnings	0.80	1.00	1.00	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
6 month av. earnings	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
12 month av. earnings	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.60	1.60	1.50	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
5 yr PWLB	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30
10 yr PWLB	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40
25 yr PWLB	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- *LIBOR and LIBID rates ceased at the end of 2021. In a continuation of our previous forecasts, our money market yield forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.*

- *Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.*

Over the last two years, the coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings until raising it to 0.25% at its meeting on 16th December 2021 and then to 0.50% at its meeting of 4th February 2022.

As shown in the forecast table above, the forecast for Bank Rate now includes a further three increases of 0.25% in March, May and November 2022 to end at 1.25%.

More recently, equity markets have been negatively impacted by the fall-out from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Concerns have focussed on supply side shocks in respect of oil, gas, wheat and other mainstream commodities, whilst global economic growth may also slow significantly

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Significant risks to the forecasts

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, or cannot be administered fast enough to prevent further lockdowns.

- **Labour and supply shortages** prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.

- **The Monetary Policy Committee** acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.

- **The Monetary Policy Committee** tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.

- **The Government** acts too quickly to cut expenditure to balance the national budget.

- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.

- **Longer term US treasury yields** rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

- **Major stock markets** e.g., in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the "moral hazard" risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market selloffs on the general economy.

- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, but also in Europe and Middle Eastern countries; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US. These could lead to increasing safe-haven flows. If Russia were to invade Ukraine, this would be likely to cause short term volatility in financial markets, but it would not be expected to have a significant impact beyond that.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

Forecasts for Bank Rate

The Monetary Policy Committee is now very concerned at the way that forecasts for inflation have had to be repeatedly increased within a matter of just a few months. Combating this rising tide of inflation is now its number one priority and the 5-4 vote marginally approving only a 0.25% increase on 4th February rather than a 0.50% increase, indicates it is now determined to push up Bank Rate quickly. A further increase of 0.25% is therefore probable for March, and again in May, followed possibly by a final one in November. However, data between now and November could shift these timings or add to or subtract from the number of increases.
However, it is likely that these forecasts will need changing within a relatively short timeframe for the following reasons: -

- We do not know whether there will be further mutations of Covid and how severe they may be, nor how rapidly scientific advances may be made in combating them.

- The economy was running out of steam during the second half of 2021 and Omicron will mean that economic growth in quarter 1 of 2022 is likely to be flat, though on the rise towards the end of the quarter as the economy recovers. However, 54% energy cap cost increases from April, together with 1.25% extra employee national insurance, food inflation around 5% and council tax likely to rise in the region of 5% too - these increases are going to hit lower income families hard despite some limited assistance from the Chancellor to postpone the full impact of rising energy costs.

- Consumers are estimated to be sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so that will cushion some of the impact of the above increases. But most of those holdings are held by more affluent people whereas poorer people already spend nearly all their income before these increases hit and have few financial reserves.

- These increases are already highly disinflationary; inflation will also be on a gradual path down after April so that raises a question as to whether the MPC may shift into protecting economic growth by November, i.e., it is more debatable as to whether they will deliver another increase then.

- The BIG ISSUE – will the current spike in inflation lead to a second-round effect in terms of labour demanding higher wages, (and/or lots of people getting higher wages by changing job)?

- If the labour market remains very tight during 2022, then wage inflation poses a greater threat to overall inflation being higher for longer, and the MPC may then feel it needs to take more action.

- If the UK were to invoke article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this would have the potential to end up in a no-deal Brexit.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, we expect to have to revise our forecasts again - in line with whatever the new news is.

Gilt yields / PWLB rates

Gilt yields. Since the start of 2021, we have seen a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. Our forecasts show little overall increase in gilt yields during the forecast period to March 2025 but there will doubtless be a lot of unpredictable volatility during this forecast period.

While monetary policy in the UK will have a major impact on gilt yields, there is also a need to consider the potential impact that rising treasury yields in America could have on gilt yields. **As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in US 10-year treasury yields and UK 10-year gilt yields. This is a significant UPWARD RISK exposure to our forecasts for medium to longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.**

US treasury yields. During the first part of 2021, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's, determination to push through a $1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. This was in addition to the $900bn support package previously passed in December 2020. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme roll-out had enabled a rapid opening up of the economy during 2021.
2. The economy was growing strongly during the first half of 2021 although it has weakened during the second half.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing substantial stimulus through monthly QE purchases during 2021.

It was not much of a surprise that a combination of these factors would eventually cause an excess of demand in the economy which generated strong inflationary pressures. This has eventually been recognised by the Fed at its recent December meeting with an aggressive response to damp inflation down during 2022 and 2023.

- **At its 3rd November Fed meeting**, the Fed decided to make a start on tapering its $120bn per month of quantitative easing (QE) purchases so that they ended next June. However, at its **15th December meeting** it doubled the pace of tapering so that they will end all purchases in February. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields and so it would be expected that treasury yields will rise over the taper period, all other things being equal.

- It also forecast that it expected there would be three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024. This would take rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy. It also gave up on calling the sharp rise in inflation as being 'transitory'.

- At its **26th January meeting**, the Fed became even more hawkish following inflation rising sharply even further. It indicated that rates would begin to rise very soon, i.e., it implied at its March meeting it would increase rates and start to run down its holdings of QE purchases. It also appears likely that the Fed could take action to **force longer term treasury yields up** by prioritising selling holdings of its longer bonds as yields at this end have been stubbornly low despite rising inflation risks. The low level of longer dated yields is a particular concern for the Fed because it is a key channel through which tighter monetary policy is meant to transmit to broader financial conditions, particularly in the US where long rates are a key driver of household and corporate borrowing costs.

There are also possible **DOWNSIDE RISKS** from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to monitor.

There is likely to be **exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates** due to the following factors: -

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields (see below). As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any upward trend in treasury yields will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other countries. **Over 10 years since 2011 there has been an average 75% correlation between movements in US treasury yields and gilt yields.** However, from time to time these two yields can diverge. Lack of spare economic capacity and rising inflationary pressures are viewed as being much greater dangers in the US than in the UK. This could mean that central bank rates will end up rising higher in the US than in the UK; the consequent increases in treasury yields could well spill over to cause (lesser) increases in gilt yields. There is, therefore, an upside risk to forecasts for gilt yields due to this correlation. The Link Group forecasts have included a risk of a 75% correlation between the two yields.
- Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- How strong and enduring will inflationary pressures turn out to be in both the US and the UK, and so impact treasury and gilt yields?
- **Will the major western central banks implement their previously stated new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies when inflation has now burst through all previous forecasts and far exceeded their target levels? Or are they going to effectively revert to their previous approach of prioritising focusing on pushing inflation back down and accepting that economic growth will be very much a secondary priority - until inflation is back down to target levels or below?**
- How well will central banks manage the running down of their stock of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the "taper tantrums" in the US in 2013?
- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?
- If Russia were to invade Ukraine, this would be likely to cause short term volatility in financial markets, but it would not be expected to have a significant impact beyond that.

The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within the forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and Russia, China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

A new era for local authority investing
– a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy

One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going <u>above</u> a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on 'achieving broad and inclusive "maximum" employment in its entirety' in the US, before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be 'sustainably over 2%' before starting on raising Bank Rate and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- ***For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.***
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures once economies recover from the various disruptions caused by the pandemic.
- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

Investment and borrowing rates

- **Investment returns** started improving in the second half of 21/22 and are expected to improve further during 22/23 as the MPC progressively increases Bank Rate.

- **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England and still remain at historically low levels. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.

- On 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The current margins over gilt yields are as follows: -.

  - **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
  - **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

- **Borrowing for capital expenditure.** Our long-term (beyond 10 years) forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%. As nearly all PWLB certainty rates are now above this level, borrowing strategy will need to be reviewed, especially as the maturity curve has flattened out considerably. Better value can be obtained at the very short and at the longer end of the curve and longer-term rates are still at historically low levels. Temporary borrowing rates are likely, however, to remain near Bank Rate and may also prove attractive as part of a balanced debt portfolio. In addition, there are also some cheap alternative sources of long-term borrowing if a client is seeking to avoid a "cost of carry" but also wishes to mitigate future re-financing risk.

- While the PCC will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, to replace maturing debt and the rundown of reserves, there will be a *cost of carry*, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.

Borrowing strategy

The PCC is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the PCC's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2022/23 treasury operations. The Chief Finance Officer & S.151 Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.*

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.*

Any decisions will be reported to the PCC at the next available opportunity.

Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The PCC will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the PCC can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

Debt rescheduling

Rescheduling of current borrowing in our debt portfolio is unlikely to occur as there is still a very large difference between premature redemption rates and new borrowing rates, even though the general margin of PWLB rates over gilt yields was reduced by 100 bps in November 2020.

All rescheduling will be reported to the PCC, at the earliest opportunity following its action.

New financial institutions as a source of borrowing and / or types of borrowing

Currently the PWLB Certainty Rate is set at gilts + 80 basis points for both HRA and non-HRA borrowing. However, consideration may still need to be given to sourcing funding from the following sources for the following reasons:

- Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities out to 3 years or so – still cheaper than the Certainty Rate).
- Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of forward dates where the objective is to avoid a "cost of carry" or to achieve refinancing certainty over the next few years).

Our advisors will keep us informed as to the relative merits of each of these alternative funding sources.

Approved Sources of Long and Short-Term Borrowing

On Balance Sheet	**Fixed**	**Variable**
PWLB	●	●
Municipal bond agency	●	●
Local authorities	●	●
Banks	●	●
Pension funds	●	●
Insurance companies	●	●
UK Infrastructure Bank	●	●
Market (long-term)	●	●
Market (temporary)	●	●
Market (LOBOs)	●	●
Stock issues	●	●
Local temporary	●	●
Local Bonds	●	
Local authority bills	●	●
Overdraft		●
Negotiable Bonds	●	●
Internal (capital receipts & revenue balances)	●	●
Commercial Paper	●	
Medium Term Notes	●	
Finance leases	●	●

ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

Investment policy – management of risk
The Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC - this was formerly the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)) and CIPFA have extended the meaning of 'investments' to include both financial and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with treasury (financial) investments, (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, essentially the purchase of income yielding assets and service investments, are covered in the Capital Strategy, (a separate report).

The PCC's investment policy has regard to the following: -

- DLUHC's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2021 ("the Code")
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2021

The PCC's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).

The above guidance from the DLUHC and CIPFA place a high priority on the management of risk. The PCC has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

1. Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.

2. **Other information:** ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the PCC will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as **"credit default swaps"** and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

3. **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

4. The PCC has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that the treasury management team are authorised to use. There are two lists in appendix 4 under the categories of 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments.

    - **Specified investments** are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year.
    - **Non-specified investments** are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by members and officers before being authorised for use.

5. **Non-specified investments limit.** The PCC has determined that it will limit the maximum total exposure to non-specified investments as being 10% of the total investment portfolio.

6. **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the matrix table in the creditworthiness policy.

7. **Transaction limits** are set for each type of investment in the creditworthiness policy.

8. The PCC will set a limit for its investments which are invested for **longer than 365 days**.

9. Investments will only be placed with counterparties from countries with a specified minimum **sovereign rating**.

10. The PCC has engaged **external consultants**, to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of the PCC in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.

11. All investments will be denominated in **sterling**.

12. As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2022/23 under IFRS 9, the PCC will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the MHCLG, concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years ending 31.3.23.

Creditworthiness policy
The primary principle governing the PCC's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the PCC will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and

- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the PCC's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Chief Finance Officer & S.151 Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to the PCC for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the PCC may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

Credit rating information is supplied by Link Group, our treasury advisors, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating Watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of the longer-term bias outside the central rating view) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to counterparty at the minimum Authority criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

The criteria for providing a pool of high quality investment counterparties (both specified and non-specified investments) is:

- Banks 1 - good credit quality **–** the PCC will only use banks which:
    i. are UK banks; and/or
    ii. are non-UK and domiciled in a country which has a minimum sovereign Long Term rating of AA-

  and have, as a minimum, the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's credit ratings (where rated):
    i. Short Term – F1;

- Banks 2 – Part nationalised UK bank – Royal Bank of Scotland. This bank can be included provided it continues to be part nationalised or it meets the ratings in Banks 1 above;

- Building societies - The PCC will *use* all societies which:
    i. Meet the ratings for banks outlined above;

- Money Market Funds – £2m limit (each). Subject to £6m maximum;

- Local authorities, Police and Fire and Crime Commissioners - £6m limit (each);

- Debt Management Office (DMO) - £no limit.

Use of additional information other than credit ratings. Additional requirements under the Code require the PCC to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria rely primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information (for example Credit Default Swaps, negative rating Watches/Outlooks) will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment opportunities.

Time and monetary limits applying to investments. The time and monetary limits for institutions on the PCC's counterparty list are as follows (these will cover both specified and non-specified investments):

	Fitch Long-term Rating (or equivalent)	Money Limit	Transaction Limit	Time Limit
Individual Banks 1&2 higher quality	**F1+**	**£6m**	**£6m**	**364 days**
Individual Banks 1&2 medium Quality	**F1**	**£6m**	**£6m**	**364 days**
Individual UK Building societies	**F1+**	**£6m**	**£6m**	**364 days**
Individual UK Building societies	**F1**	**£6m**	**£6m**	**364 days**
Local authorities/Police, Fire and Crime Commissioners		**£6m**	**£6m**	**364 days**
Money Market Funds	**AAA**	**£2m (each)**	**£2m (each)**	**liquid**

The proposed criteria for specified and non-specified investments are shown in the appendices for approval.

Country and sector limits
Due care will be taken to consider the country, group and sector exposure of the PCC's investments.

The PCC has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in the appendices. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.
In addition:

- limits in place above will apply to a group of companies;
- sector limits will be monitored regularly for appropriateness.

Investment strategy
In-house funds. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Investment returns expectations.
The current forecasts are for the Bank Rate to reach 1.25% in November 2022.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

Average earnings in each year	Now	Previously
2022/23	1.00%	0.50%
2023/24	1.25%	0.75%
2024/25	1.25%	1.00%
2025/26	1.25%	1.25%
Years 6 to 10	1.50%	-
Years 10+	2.00%	2.00%

Investment treasury indicator and limit - total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the PCC's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.
The PCC is asked to approve the following treasury indicator and limit:

Upper limit for principal sums invested for longer than 365 days is nil			
£m	**2022/23**	**2023/24**	**2024/25**
Principal sums invested for longer than 365 days	£m nil	£m nil	£m nil
Current investments as at *31.03.23* in excess of 1 year maturing in each year	nil	nil	nil

Investment risk benchmarking

This PCC will use an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio of 3 month LIBID uncompounded.

End of year investment report

At the end of the financial year, the PCC will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

Day to day Treasury Management

Kingston Upon Hull City Council manage the PCC's treasury management functions under the terms of a service level agreement in accordance with the approved Annual Treasury Management Strategy.

APPENDICES

1. Prudential and treasury indicators and MRP statement
2. Interest rate forecasts
3. Economic background
4. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management
5. Approved countries for investments
6. Treasury management scheme of delegation
7. The treasury management role of the section 151 officer
8. Capital Strategy

Appendix 1

THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS 2022/23 – 2025/26 AND MRP STATEMENT

The PCC's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist the PCCs' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

Capital expenditure

Capital expenditure £m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Total	**28.573**	**16.236**	**11.198**	**10.822**	**5.221**

Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The PCC is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG regulations have been issued which require the PCC to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to authorities and PCCs, so long as there is a prudent provision. The PCC is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

The PCC has continued to adopt Option 2, the CFR approach in respect of pre-2007/08 debt as indicated above along with use of the asset life method of calculating the MRP for borrowing after that date by setting aside each year an amount that in simple terms equalled approximately 4% of the amount of capital expenditure financed from borrowing.

For post 2008 debt Option 3 is adopted, using the annuity method for calculating the MRP and that rate and amortisation period shall be determined by the PCC's Chief Finance Officer.

The annuity method is now widely used as it makes provision for an annual charge to revenue that takes account of the time value of money (whereby £100 in 10 years time is less of a burden than paying £100 now. The charges produced by the annuity method result in a consistent charge over the life of the asset taking into account he real value of the annual charges when they fall due. The method also reflects the fact that assets deteriorate and deterioration is slower in the early years and accelerates towards the latter end of the life of the assets. This approach conforms to the MHCLG requirement to make a prudent provision over a period which is broadly commensurate with the period that the capital expenditure provides benefit. The annuity calculation method results in lower MRP payments in the early years but higher payment in later years but has the advantage of linking MRP to the flow of benefits from an asset where these are expected to be in later years.

Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the PCC's overall finances. The PCC is asked to approve the following indicators:

Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream – Indicator 6
This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long-term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Ratios	2.69%	3.27%	4.02%	4.45%	4.55%

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

Maturity structure of borrowing
Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the PCC's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The PCC is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2022/23 – Indicator 7		
	Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months	0	15%
12 months to 2 years	0	15%
2 years to 5 years	0	30%
5 years to 10 years	0	60%
10 years and above	0	80%

Appendix 2

Interest Rate Forecasts 2022 – 2025

Link Group Interest Rate View 7.2.22	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
3 month av. earnings	0.80	1.00	1.00	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
6 month av. earnings	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
12 month av. earnings	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.60	1.60	1.50	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
5 yr PWLB	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30
10 yr PWLB	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40
25 yr PWLB	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40

Appendix 3

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

COVID-19 and vaccines.

Vaccines were the game changer during 2021 which raised high hopes that life in the UK would be able to largely return to normal in the second half of the year. However, the bursting onto the scene of the Omicron mutation at the end of November, rendered the initial two doses of all vaccines largely ineffective in preventing infection. This dashed such hopes and raised major concerns that a fourth wave of the virus could overwhelm hospitals in early 2022. What we now know is that although this mutation is very fast spreading, it does not cause severe illness in fully vaccinated people. Rather than go for a full lockdown which would have heavily damaged the economy, the government strategy this time focused on getting as many people as possible to have a third (booster) vaccination after three months from the previous last injection., It also placed restrictions on large indoor gatherings and hospitality venues over Christmas and into January and requested workers to work from home. This hit sectors like restaurants, travel, tourism and hotels hard which had already been hit hard during 2021. Economic growth will also have been lower due to people being ill and not working. The economy, therefore, faces significant headwinds in early 2022 although some sectors have learned how to cope well with Covid. The big question still remains as to whether any further mutations of this virus could develop which render all current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them, and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread, until tweaked vaccines become widely available.

A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE FUTURE PATH OF BANK RATE

- The threat from Omicron was a wild card causing huge national concern at the time of December's MPC meeting; now it is seen as a vanquished foe disappearing in the rear-view mirror.
- The MPC shifted up a gear last week in raising Bank Rate by another 0.25% and narrowly avoiding making it a 0.50% increase by a 5-4 voting margin.
- Our forecast now expects the MPC to deliver another 0.25% increase in March; their position appears to be to go for sharp increases to get the job done and dusted.
- The expected March increase is likely to be followed by another increase to 1.0% in May and then to 1.25% in November.
- The MPC is currently much more heavily focused on combating inflation than on protecting economic growth.
- However, 54% energy cap cost increases from April, together with 1.25% extra employee national insurance, food inflation around 5% and council tax likely to rise in the region of 5% too - these increases are going to hit lower income families hard despite some limited assistance from the Chancellor to postpone the full impact of rising energy costs.
- Consumers are estimated to be sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so that will cushion some of the impact of the above increases. But most of those holdings are held by more affluent people whereas poorer people already spend nearly all their income before these increases hit and have few financial reserves.
- These increases are going to be highly disinflationary; inflation will also be on a gradual path down after April so that raises a question as to whether the MPC may shift into protecting economic growth by November, i.e., it is more debatable as to whether they will deliver another increase then.
- The BIG ISSUE – will the current spike in inflation lead to a second-round effect in terms of labour demanding higher wages, (and/or lots of people getting higher wages by changing job)?

- If the labour market remains very tight during 2022, then wage inflation poses a greater threat to overall inflation being higher for longer, and the MPC may then feel it needs to take more action.

PWLB RATES

- The yield curve has flattened out considerably in the first two months of 2022.
- We view the markets as having built in, already, nearly all the effects on gilt yields of the likely increases in Bank Rate in 2022.
- It is difficult to say currently what effect the Bank of England starting to sell gilts will have on gilt yields once Bank Rate rises to 1%: it is likely to act cautiously as it has already started on not refinancing maturing debt. A passive process of not refinancing maturing debt could begin in March when the 4% 2022 gilt matures; the Bank owns £25bn of this issuance. A pure roll-off of the £875bn gilt portfolio by not refinancing bonds as they mature, would see the holdings fall to about £415bn by 2031, which would be about equal to the Bank's pre-pandemic holding. Last August, the Bank said it would not actively sell gilts until the *"Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%"* and, *"depending on economic circumstances at the time."*
- It is possible that Bank Rate will not rise above 1% as the MPC could shift to relying on quantitative tightening (QT) to do the further work of taking steam out of the economy and reducing inflationary pressures.
- Increases in US treasury yields over the next few years could add upside pressure on gilt yields though, more recently, gilts have been much more correlated to movements in bund yields than treasury yields.

MPC meeting 4th February 2022

- After the Bank of England became the first major western central bank to put interest rates up in this upswing of the economic cycle in December, it has quickly followed up its first 0.15% rise by another 0.25% rise to 0.50%, in the second of what is very likely to be a series of increases during 2022.
- The Monetary Policy Committee voted by a majority of 5-4 to increase Bank Rate by 25bps to 0.5% with the minority preferring to increase Bank Rate by 50bps to 0.75%. The Committee also voted unanimously for the following: -
  - to reduce the £875n stock of UK government bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, by ceasing to reinvest maturing assets.
  - to begin to reduce the £20bn stock of sterling non-financial investment-grade corporate bond purchases by ceasing to reinvest maturing assets and by a programme of corporate bond sales to be completed no earlier than towards the end of 2023.
- The Bank again sharply increased its forecast for inflation – to now reach a peak of 7.25% in April, well above its 2% target.
- The Bank estimated that UK GDP rose by 1.1% in quarter 4 of 2021 but, because of the effect of Omicron, GDP would be flat in quarter 1, but with the economy recovering during February and March. Due to the hit to households' disposable incomes from higher inflation, it revised down its GDP growth forecast for 2022 from 3.75% to 3.25%.
- The Bank is concerned at how tight the labour market is with vacancies at near record levels and a general shortage of workers - who are in a very favourable position to increase earnings by changing job.
- As in the December 2021 MPC meeting, the MPC was more concerned with combating inflation over the medium term than supporting economic growth in the short term. However, what was notable was the Bank's forecast for inflation: based on the markets' expectations that Bank Rate will rise to 1.50% by mid-2023, it forecast inflation to be only

1.6% in three years' time. In addition, if energy prices beyond the next six months fell as the futures market suggests, the Bank said CPI inflation in three years' time would be even lower at 1.25%. With calculations of inflation, the key point to keep in mind is that it is the rate of change in prices – not the level – that matters. Accordingly, even if oil and natural gas prices remain flat at their current elevated level, energy's contribution to headline inflation will drop back over the course of this year. That means the current energy contribution to CPI inflation, of 2% to 3%, will gradually fade over the next year.

- So, the message to take away from the Bank's forecast is that they do not expect Bank Rate to rise to 1.5% in order to hit their target of CPI inflation of 2%. The immediate issue is with four members having voted for a 0.50% increase in February, it would only take one member more for there to be another 0.25% increase at the March meeting.

- **The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative tightening) holdings of bonds is as follows: -
    1. Raising Bank Rate as "the active instrument in most circumstances".
    2. Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
    3. Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
    4. Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

OUR FORECASTS

a. Bank Rate

- Covid remains a major potential downside threat as we are most likely to get further mutations. However, their severity and impact could vary widely, depending on vaccine effectiveness and how broadly it is administered.
- If the UK invokes article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this has the potential to end up in a no-deal Brexit.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, we expect to have to revise our forecasts again - in line with whatever the new news is.

b. PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

Gilt yields. Since the start of 2021, we have seen a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. After sharp increase in most gilt yields in the first two months of 2022, our forecasts show little overall increase in gilt yields during the forecast period to March 2025; but there will doubtless be a lot of unpredictable volatility during this forecast period.

While monetary policy in the UK will have a major impact on gilt yields, there is also a need to consider the potential impact that rising treasury yields in America could have on gilt yields. **As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in US 10-year treasury yields and UK 10-year gilt yields. This is a significant UPWARD RISK exposure to our forecasts for medium to longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.**

US treasury yields. During the first part of 2021, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's, determination to push through a $1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. This was in addition to the $900bn support package previously passed in December 2020. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme roll-out had enabled a rapid opening up of the economy during 2021.
2. The economy was growing strongly during the first half of 2021 although it has weakened during the second half.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing substantial stimulus through monthly QE purchases during 2021.

It was not much of a surprise that a combination of these factors would eventually cause an excess of demand in the economy which generated strong inflationary pressures. This has eventually been recognised by the Fed at its recent December meeting with an aggressive response to damp inflation down during 2022 and 2023.

- **At its 3rd November Fed meeting**, the Fed decided to make a start on tapering its $120bn per month of QE purchases so that they ended next June. However, at its **15th December meeting** it doubled the pace of tapering so that they will end all purchases in February. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields and so it would be expected that treasury yields will rise over the taper period, all other things being equal.

- It also forecast that it expected there would be three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024. This would take rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy. It also gave up on calling the sharp rise in inflation as being 'transitory'.

- At its **26th January meeting**, the Fed became even more hawkish following inflation rising sharply even further. It indicated that rates would begin to rise very soon, i.e., it implied at its March meeting it would increase rates and start to run down its holdings of QE purchases. It also appears likely that the Fed could take action to force longer term treasury yields up by prioritising selling holdings of its longer bonds as yields at this end have been stubbornly low despite rising inflation risks. The low level of longer dated yields is a particular concern for the Fed because it is a key channel through which tighter monetary policy is meant to transmit to broader financial conditions, particularly in the US where long rates are a key driver of household and corporate borrowing costs.

There are also possible **DOWNSIDE RISKS** from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to monitor.

Globally, our views are as follows: -

- **EU.** The ECB joined with the Fed by announcing on **16th December** that it will be reducing its QE purchases - by half from October 2022, i.e., it will still be providing significant stimulus via QE purchases during the first half of 2022. The ECB did not change its rate at its **3rd February** meeting, but it was clearly shocked by the increase in inflation to 5.1% in January. The President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde, hinted in the press conference after the meeting that the ECB may accelerate monetary tightening before long and she hinted that asset purchases could be reduced more quickly than implied by the previous guidance. She also refused to reaffirm officials' previous assessment that interest rate hikes in 2022 are "very unlikely". It, therefore, now looks likely that all three major western central banks will be raising rates this year in the face of sharp increases in inflation - which is looking increasingly likely to be stubbornly high and for much longer than the previous oft repeated 'transitory' descriptions implied.

- **China.** The pace of economic growth has now fallen back after the initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and China has been struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through using sharp local lockdowns - which depress economic growth. However, with Omicron having now spread to China, and being much more easily transmissible, lockdown strategies may not prove so successful in future. To boost flagging economic growth, The People's Bank of China cut its key interest rate in December 2021.

- **Japan.** 2021 was a patchy year in combating Covid. However, recent business surveys indicate that the economy is rebounding rapidly now that the bulk of the population is fully vaccinated, and new virus cases have plunged. The Bank of Japan is continuing its very loose monetary policy but with little prospect of getting inflation back towards its target of 2% any time soon.

- **World growth.** World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum more recently. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of **world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.

- **Supply shortages**. The pandemic and extreme weather events, followed by a major surge in demand after lockdowns ended, have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. Major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China built up rapidly during quarters 2 and 3 of 2021 but then halved during quarter 4. Such issues have led to a misdistribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. The latest additional disruption has been a shortage of coal in China leading to power cuts focused primarily on producers (rather than consumers), i.e., this will further aggravate shortages in meeting demand for goods. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods available to purchase.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates include: -

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed or unable to be administered fast enough to stop the NHS being overwhelmed.

- **Labour and supply shortages** prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.

- **Bank of England** acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.

- **The Government** acts too quickly to increase taxes and/or cut expenditure to balance the national budget.

- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.

- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in Ukraine/Russia, Iran, China, North Korea and Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe-haven flows. If Russia were to invade Ukraine, this would be likely to cause short term volatility in financial markets, but it would not be expected to have a significant impact beyond that.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates: -

- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.

- Longer term US treasury yields rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

Appendix 4

TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:
(All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' rating criteria where applicable)

	Minimum 'High' Credit Criteria	**Use**
Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	--	In-house
Term deposits – local authorities	--	In-house
Term deposits – banks and building societies	F1	In-house

Term deposits with nationalised banks and banks and building societies

	Minimum Credit Criteria	**Use**	**Max % of total investments**	**Max. maturity period**
UK part nationalised banks	UK sovereign rating or Short-term F1, Sovereign rating AA-	In-house	**50%**	**364 days**
Banks part nationalised by high credit rated (sovereign rating) countries – non UK	Sovereign rating or Short-term F1, Sovereign rating AA-	In-house	**50%**	**364 days**

Collective Investment Schemes structured as Open Ended Investment Companies (OEICs): -		
1. Money Market Funds	AAA rated	In-house

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this PCC. To ensure that the PCC is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: The PCC will not make investments longer than 1 year

TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (TMP1) – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT

The MHCLG issued Investment Guidance in 2018, and this forms the structure of the PCC's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.

The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for authorities and PCCs to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this PCC to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes. The PCC adopted the Code on 15/02/2010 and will apply its principles to all investment activity. In accordance with the Code, the Chief Finance Officer and S.151 Officer has produced its treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

Annual investment strategy - The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of following:

- The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments, particularly non-specified investments;
- The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed;
- Specified investments that the PCC will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the PCC, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than a year;
- Non-specified investments, clarifying the greater risk implications, identifying the general types of investment that may be used and a limit to the overall amount of various categories that can be held at any time.

The investment policy proposed for the PCC is:

Strategy guidelines – The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

Specified investments – These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity. These are considered low risk assets where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include sterling investments which would not be defined as capital expenditure with:

1. The UK Government (such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility, UK treasury bills or a gilt with less than one year to maturity).
2. Supranational bonds of less than one year's duration.
3. A local authority, housing association, parish council or community council.
4. Pooled investment vehicles (such as money market funds) that have been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency. For category 4 this covers pooled investment vehicles, such as money market funds, rated AAA by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and / or Fitch rating agencies.
5. A body that is considered of a high credit quality (such as a bank or building society For category 5 this covers bodies with a minimum Short Term rating of F1 (or the equivalent) as rated by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and / or Fitch rating agencies .

Within these bodies, and in accordance with the Code, the PCC has set additional criteria to set the time and amount of monies which will be invested in these bodies.

Non-specified investments –are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as specified above). The PCC will not use these types of investments.

The monitoring of investment counterparties - The credit rating of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The PCC receives credit rating information (changes, rating watches and rating outlooks) from Link Asset Services as and when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Chief Finance Officer & S.151 Officer, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.

Appendix 5

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher, (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link credit worthiness service.

Based on lowest available rating

AAA

- Australia
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Canada
- Finland
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

AA-

- Belgium
- Hong Kong
- Qatar
- U.K.

Appendix 6

TREASURY MANAGEMENT SCHEME OF DELEGATION

Police and Crime Commissioner

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy;
- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment;
- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

Appendix 7

THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 151 OFFICER

The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers;
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long term timeframe;
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money;
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the PCC;
- ensure that the PCC has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing;
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the PCC does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the PCC to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources;
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities;
- provision of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees;
- ensuring that there is an adequate understanding of the risk exposures taken on by the PCC;
- ensuring that the PCC has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above;
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following:-
    - *Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;*

Appendix 8

CAPITAL STRATEGY

1. Introduction

1.1 There is a new requirement on local authorities (including Police and Crime Commissioners) to prepare a capital strategy each year, which sets out our approach to capital expenditure and financing at a high level. The requirement to prepare a strategy arises from Government concerns about a small number of authorities borrowing substantial sums (relative to their budget) to invest in commercial property, often outside the area of the authority concerned.

1.2 There is also a new requirement on local authorities to prepare an investment strategy, which specifies our approach to making investments other than day to day treasury management investments (the latter is included in our treasury management strategy, as in previous years). Given that the Police and Crime Commissioner for Humberside makes no such investments, a strategy has not been prepared.

1.3 This Appendix sets out the proposed capital strategy for approval.

2. Capital Expenditure

2.1 The capital expenditure plans are approved by the PCC, as part of the budget report each year.

2.2 The capital programme is usually restricted to:-

(a) Investment in operational buildings – e.g. stations and administrative offices;

(b) Renewal of operational fleet;

(c) New and replacement equipment;

(d) Investment in ICT.

2.3 The PCC's Code of Corporate Governance sets out the delegations to the Chief Constable on the delivery of the capital programme.

2.4 Capital expenditure on **buildings**, where funded from the capital programme, is principally directed to maintaining the fitness of the operational estate. Major property investments are considered as part of the overall estates strategy.

2.5 Expenditure on the **renewal of the fleet** is directed by the replacement programme approved by the PCC.

2.6 Capital expenditure on **operational equipment** ensures equipment is replaced when it has reached the end of its useful life or has become technologically obsolescent. It also enables the PCC to invest in new technology.

2.7 Capital expenditure on **ICT** is determined by the ICT replacement and Improvement programme which is approved by the PCC.

2.8 Monitoring of capital expenditure is carried out by the COG; the Accountability Board, Joint Independent Audit Committee and the PCC. Reports are presented throughout the year and at outturn.

2.9 the PCC does not capitalise expenditure, except where it can do so in compliance with proper practices: it does not apply for directions to capitalise revenue expenditure.

2.10 Past and forecast capital expenditure is:-

End of:	£m
19/20	8.747
20/21	18.097
21/22	28.573
22/23	16.236
23/24	11.198
24/25	10.822
25/26	5.221

3. Financing of Capital Expenditure

3.1 The PCC funds capital expenditure from the revenue budget, capital receipts and prudential borrowing.

3.2 Prudential borrowing is used to fund capital expenditure, within the limits prescribed within the Annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement. This is reviewed annually for affordability.

3.3 The PCC measures its capital financial requirement, which shows our underlying need to borrow for a capital purpose. This is shown in the table below:-

End of:	Total CFR
	£000
22/23	137,882
23/24	141,842
24/25	144,282
25/26	140,640

3.4 Projections of actual debt are part of the treasury management indicators in the Annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement.

4. Debt Repayment

4.1 The PCC is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG regulations have been issued which require the PCC to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to authorities and PCCs, so long as there is a prudent provision. The PCC is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

The PCC has continued to adopt Option 2, the CFR approach in respect of pre-2007/08 debt as indicated above along with use of the asset life method of calculating the MRP for borrowing after that date by setting aside each year an amount that in simple terms equalled approximately 4% of the amount of capital expenditure financed from borrowing.

For post 2008 debt Option 3 be adopted, using the annuity method for calculating the MRP and that rate and amortisation period shall be determined by the PCC's Chief Finance Officer.

The annuity method is now widely used as it makes provision for an annual charge to revenue that takes account of the time value of money (whereby £100 in 10 years tome is less of a burden than paying £100 now. The charges produced by the annuity method result in a consistent charge over the life of the asset taking into account the real value of the annual charges when they fall due. The method also reflects the fact that assets deteriorate and deterioration is slower in the early years and accelerates towards the latter end of the life of the assets. This approach conforms to the MHCLG requirement to make a prudent provision over a period which is broadly commensurate with the period that the capital expenditure provides benefit. The annuity calculation method results in lower MRP payments in the early years but higher payment in later years but has the advantage of linking MRP to the flow of benefits from an asset where these are expected to be in later years.

5. Commercial Activity

5.1 Government guidance now requires us to specify our policy towards non-financial investments.

5.2 The PCC makes no such investments.